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A Comparative Study on Landownership between China and England 
(ABSTRACT) 
 
 By comparing the development of landownership in China and England, this paper 
explores what were behind their different trajectories.  In particular, I examined the delineation 
of property rights, alienation of land, rent and tax, inheritance and accumulation of land.  Feudal 
England was a combination of the Roman system and Anglo-Saxon tradition.  From that very 
strict hierarchical structure England has experienced an evolution toward free land market.  In 
contrast, since very early China has established a unique economic system that allowed free 
alienation of land, but it has been trying to check the development of land market and private 
property rights by various means, the most important of which is the strengthening and 
expanding of patriarchal clan system.  The different development paths of China and England 
show the different responses of two different cultures, which are oriented toward family and 
individual, respectively, to the same problems related to landownership. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Landownership, as the foundation of property rights, has played an important role in 
economic history.  Private land ownership, upon which the notion of private property rights are 
built, is often regarded as the most efficient form of ownership.  Even from the perspective of 
equity, some also argue that establishing private property rights helps the poor (de Soto 2000).  
However, great diversity in the evolution of different societies suggests that private 
landownership is not the natural result of economic development.  Even when some countries try 
to transplant those economic institutions that are more or less based on individualism-oriented 
social culture, they meet systematic resistance from deep inside the society.  Furthermore, 
experience from widespread land reform movement in last century, regardless of their political 
objectives, also suggests that landownership is not just a simple matter related to economic 
efficiency.  It is also constrained by various social factors, including our social inertia—culture. 
This paper presents a comparative study on landownership between England and China.  
We want to answer the following questions: what are different between China and England in 
their development of landownership?  Why are they different?  What is the significance of these 
differences to current land policies?  England is where capitalism was born and is often regarded 
as a typical country of western civilization, while China has a long history of a stable ‘feudal’ 
economy.1  For comparative purpose, what is also important is that China had had little 
communication with Western countries until the 19th century and, therefore, it developed in a 
relatively independent way.  Moreover, both countries have long histories of recorded materials, 
which greatly facilitate secondary studies while simultaneously imposing great difficulty in 
                                                          
1 In China, the word “feudal” often refers to the time period from the Warring States to Qing Dynasty (BC 453 or 
BC 475 - AD 1840) (see Hu, 1978).  However the use of the word “feudal” is rather confusing because the Chinese 
society was very different from Europe throughout its long history.  The intention of Chinese scholars to use the 
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grasping the essence of their histories.  Due to limitation of time and space, this paper mainly 
relies on second-hand materials, while trying to combine the law with the actual historical facts. 
 Many economic historians, institutional economists, sociologists and theorists have made 
great contribution to the study of property rights.  There is an enormous literature that can be 
traced back at least to Max Weber.  Recent studies include North and Thomas (1976) who 
argued that institutions are the crucial determinant of economic performance.  North (1991) 
abandoned the “efficiency view of institutions” and attributed inefficient property rights to the 
rulers who “devised property rights in their own interests”2.  Macfarlane (1979) examined the 
historical data on ownership in England and concluded that individualist ownership was the 
central feature of the English system and was peculiar to that country.  Chao (1986) argued that 
population pressure induced the institutional changes in China.  Putnam’s (1994) study 
confirmed the relationship between institutional performance and civic tradition in Italy.  Greif 
(1994) analyzed how cultural beliefs account for societal organizations and their path 
dependence.  All these studies broadened our understanding of culture and institutions, but most 
of them deal with the issue in a general way, seldom focusing on landownership.  
 Through a brief review of the evolution of landownership in China and England, I 
examined some important aspects of landownership, including the delineation of property rights, 
rent and tax, inheritance, and land accumulation.  The comparative analysis indicates that social 
unit is an important determinant of landownership as well as culture.3  Family is the central 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
term might be to transplant Marx’s theory of different stages in the historic development.  See also Li and Jiang’s 
(2005) non-traditional view on this issue. 
2 In his book, Institutions, Institutional Changes and Economic Performance, North admitted the impact of culture 
on institutions.  Rather than regarding culture as a different factor, he seemed to include culture into a broad 
conception of institutions by using the word “informal constraints” to cover those “culturally derived”. 
3 It is difficult to find a definition of culture as commonly received.  Here I adopt what Thompson, Ellis and 
Wildavsky (1990) defined, “cultural bias refers to shared values and beliefs; social relations are defined as patterns 
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feature of Chinese culture while individual is more important in the history of England.  The 
same is true with landownership.  In addition to the property right that family has over land, the 
ancient Chinese society was also organized in a way similar to family, making clear delineation 
of property rights impossible.  This appears to be a central difference between the two countries.  
The different development paths of landownership were determined by their different cultures.  
England developed from feudalism to capitalism, from strict tenure system to free land market, 
while China sustained super-stability by strengthening the patriarchal clan system in both social 
philosophy and real life.   
 The next section briefly reviews the historic evolution of landownership in England and 
China, respectively, and then compares them in the third section.  The fourth section explores 
why they have different trajectories.  The fifth section discusses some further issues and 
concludes the paper. 
 
HISTORIC EVOLUTION OF LANDOWNERSHIP 
 When reviewing the history of landownership in the two countries, we will focus on 
some basic features we are interested in, such as alienation, rent and tax, hereditary rules as well 
as land policy.4  Although it is difficult to ascertain from written documents what actually 
happened, our description in this paper will be based on a generally valid picture depicted by 
historians without the burden of restoring the precisely ‘true’ history.  This section describes two 
different tracks of development.  Feudal England was a combination of the Roman system and 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition.  It has experienced an evolution from a very strict hierarchical 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of interpersonal relations”.  I use the word ‘culture’ to represent the combination of social relations and cultural bias.  
In a broad sense, social unit could be regarded as part of culture. 
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structure toward free land market.  On the contrary, since very early China has established a land 
market that allowed free land alienation, but it had been trying to check the development of land 
market and private property rights by various means, the most important of which is the 
strengthening and expanding of patriarchal clan system.  These two different stories of evolution 
provide the basis for our comparative analysis. 
 
England: from Feudalism to Capitalism 
 Little is known about England before the Norman Conquest (AD 1066), which brought to 
the island a strong and universal system of feudalism that is essentially a hierarchical structure of 
tenure in landownership.  It is obvious that the theory of tenure in the minds of Norman 
administrators were from the Continent.  Hence, in order to know the origin of feudalism, it is 
necessary to trace back to Gaul, then a Roman colony, and further to Roman system. 
 In the early Roman society, the social and economic unit was a “patriarchal house 
community, familia, the state in little”.5   It functioned simultaneously as the religious, political 
and juridical organization.  It is very different from our modern notion of family (father, mother, 
and children).  Propinquity and the power of the head cemented this social unit and determined 
its characteristics and internal organization.6  It was made up of a group united mainly by other 
relationships than those of consanguinity, and the larger and more successful it became, the more 
heterogeneous were its constituents (Noyes, 1936).7  All human beings and non-human objects 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 I will examine landownership around the basic features of private property, as Cheung (1982) defined, “(a) the 
right to exclude others so that he alone may decide on its use; (b) the right to extract exclusive income from its use; 
and (c) the right to transfer or sell the property or resource to anyone as he sees fit.” 
5 Outside familia there began to emerge super-familia government and law, which did not intrude with these units 
and itself “was largely a replica” of familia. 
6 Noyes, pp.  122-123.  However, this social unit is not without controversy.  Noyes wrote that many authorities 
thought that “the social unit was what we call a ‘family’ - that is, man, wife and progeny”. 
7 Noyes, pp.106. 
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as well as land belonged to the head.  Later a distinction between free members of the household 
and slaves appeared to be made by using the word ‘dominium’.  There were also semi-
dependents who attached to the house community for the sake of the protection given by the 
membership (manus).  Succession to the pater was not decided by the custom of primogeniture 
but the testament of the father.  The continuance of the patriarchal family was verified by “the 
evidence that many heredia remained in the same families for generations and even centuries, 
which would seem to be impossible if the familia were divided.”8 
 With the development of Roman society, the super-familia government and law was 
greatly strengthened and began to influence within the familia.  The classic Roman law included 
two kinds of power over persons according to their status as was within or without the family.  
The former was the Law of Persons; the latter the Law of Obligations.  Meanwhile as regards 
power over material objects, there were again two kinds of laws according to whether they were 
within or without the family.”9  Thus, a clear distinction was made between within and without 
the familia.  Later with the penetration of law, the biological related members became freer 
while the rest remained the same as before.  Many others, as client (or amicus), gave themselves 
and their possessions to the patron so that their status could be assimilated to that of a member of 
the familia and received the patron’s protection.  Hence we see that the basic characteristic of 
Roman organization was the dual structure, i.e., the distinction between inside and outside 
familia.  The law governed the outside sphere while the inside “was organized upon a 
hierarchical basis” with head, ranks and dependents.10 
 As one of the greatest empires of the ancient time, the organization of the Roman system 
greatly influenced Europe in the following centuries.  In Gaul there was a lot of evidence of the 
                                                          
8 Noyes, pp.125. 
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Roman institution, transplanted almost intact.11  Although Roman Empire finally collapsed, the 
Roman economic organization upon the land persisted.  Hence, after the Conquest the Norman 
dynasty imposed a system “which closely resembles these internal property relations of the 
Roman familia, though ...  to apply on a nation-wide scale”.12  That was the feudal system. 
 Feudalism was a form of dependent land holding -- the holding of land in return for the 
rendering of services, typically military service.  “What was involved was both a personal 
relationship between superior and inferior, lord and vassal, marked by reciprocal duties of 
protection and service, and the granting of a benefice, that is, a parcel of landed estate to be 
enjoyed upon favorable terms, so long as the services due was faithfully performed.”13  The 
highest lord was the King and at the bottom of this structure were those humble peasants.  
Between them were the numerous knights who provided his quota of service to the King by 
subinfeudation to other knights or peasants.  The King’s immediate grantee was called tenant in 
chief, and the service that the tenant owed to the knight was knight’s fees.  Theoretically, this 
sequence of subinfeudation could be rather long on a single parcel of land.  There was no explicit 
limitation to the services upon a grant of land, and thus a diversity of tenures existed.  Sir 
Thomas Littleton (1415-81) classified them as the following: Knight-service, Escuage or 
Scutage and Castle-gard, Grand Serjeanty, Frankalmoin, Frankmarriage, Socage Tenure, Petit 
Serjeanty, Burgage, and Fee Farm.  Socage tenure was agricultural tenure of free peasants, in 
contrast to the tenure of villeinage.  Knight-service and Escuage were military tenures.  Fee 
Farm is for tenants who held land heritable for money rent.  Frankmarriage was related with the 
entail in that it allowed no services due for three generations.  Related with the different types of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 Noyes, pp.213. 
10 Noyes, pp.21 
11 Noyes, pp.217. 
12 Noyes, pp.222. 
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tenure were the incidents which the tenant must pay, such as Homage and Fealty, Aids, Relief 
and Primer Seisin, Wardship and Marriage, Escheat and Forfeiture.  If a tenant failed to observe 
his duties, he would be tried in the feudal or seigniorial court of his lord.  The royal court, held 
by the King, only cared about his tenants in chief without meddling inside the seigniorial courts.  
In this way we see a strict hierarchical system that was politically, economically, socially and 
legally defined. 
 With the development of the common law of land around the Real Actions (the 12th 
century to the 15th century), the royal court gradually covered land disputes of free tenants.  
Glanvill was the first who began limiting the lord’s court.  He stated that “no man need answer 
in any court for his freehold land unless commanded to do so by the King’s writ”.14  Although 
real actions dealt with various complicated issues regarding title and developed around the 
concept of Seisin (like the concept of actual possession), they brought about a major transfer of 
jurisdiction over land and marked a fundamental change of legal ideas.  It was argued that “what 
was involved was a movement from a world in which the central concept was one of reciprocal 
obligations, to one in which lord and tenant were conceived of as independently holding property 
rights, good against the world.”15  So it was the real actions, which took the free tenants under 
the protection of royal court, that initiated the destruction of the underpinnings of the feudal 
bond. 
 Under the original feudal system the tenant’s fee was not heritable since “the tenure 
between lord and tenant was very much a personal affair which came to an end when the tenant 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 Simpson, pp.2. 
14 Quoted from Simpson, pp.25. 
15 Simpson, pp.36-37.  There were similar opinions, such as mentioned in Simpson’s book that “the rise of the 
common law, operating through the early real actions, brought about a transfer of entitlements from lords to 
tenants.” 
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or lord died”.16  The heirs of a tenant needed to buy back the lands.  However in Glanvill’s time 
the fee (or fief) had been firmly regarded as heritable.  Meanwhile primogeniture was adopted as 
the rule of inheritance first in military tenures and later in socage.  By Edward I’s time 
primogeniture had become the common law of all tenures.  A set of complex rules were 
developed to specify the sequence of inheritance depending upon the lineal and collateral 
relationships.  A distinguished feature of the law in Glanvill’s time was that will as well as 
death-bed gift was excluded. 
 In Glanvill’s time the free alienation of land was not yet possible.  The gradual change in 
practice led to the statute of Quia Emptores (AD 1290), which had that “from henceforth it shall 
be lawful for every freeman to sell at his own pleasure his lands and tenements”.17  Transfer of 
the land was carried out by substitution instead of subinfeudation.  Then there arose the concept 
of the fee simple, which was both alienable and heritable.  In 1285 the strong protest from the 
nobles made the statute De Donis Conolitionalibus drafted in purpose of preventing the 
alienation by holders of conditional fees.  Nevertheless the statute of De Donis brought forth the 
doctrine of estates, which “involves a recognition not simply that the sum of possible interest - 
the fee simple - may be cut up into slices like a cake and distributed amongst a number of people, 
but that all of them will obtain present existing interests in the land, though their right to actual 
enjoyment, to seisin in land, may be postponed”.18 
 After the invention of the doctrine of estates, the English system of landownership and 
land law evolved with the controversies on the right of alienation and the subsequent devices of 
promoting or preventing free alienation.  In face of the limitation imposed by entails, collusive 
common recoveries was found to efficiently bar entails.  Then an expediency called clauses of 
                                                          
16 Simpson, pp.49. 
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perpetuity was devised to restrain the alienation of entailed lands.  In addition to the doctrine of 
estates and the doctrine of seisin, the widespread application of the use indicated how people 
avoided the feudal dues and facilitated conveyance.  This was showed clearly in the victory of 
people who stood against the attempt to abolish the power of devise (drafting the will for land) in 
the 16th century.  In 1536 the rebellion known as the Pilgrimage of Grace fully represented the 
anger toward the rigid doctrine of primogeniture.  In 1540 “the Statute of Wills allowed land-
owners to devise two-thirds of their lands held in knight-service, and all their lands held in 
socage”.19  In this way the King could still obtain the feudal dues.  Nonetheless by intelligently 
applying a device made up of the combination of the use and the will the landowners could 
eventually evade the Crown’s dues.  Again, in order to overcome the seemingly insuperable 
entails, new rule was found.  In the Duke of Norfolk’s Case, landowner was not allowed to settle 
the devolution of land too far into a future which he could not foresee.  In return, the settlers 
devised more complex form of settlement to keep the land in the family perpetually.  In spite of 
all these controversies a trend toward a free land market could be clearly observed. 
 From the 15th century on the copyhold tenants’ position began to improve.  They were 
protected by both the common-law courts and the Chancellor.  Free alienation of the copyhold 
land was gradually permitted. 
 In retrospect of the post-medieval land law, it is obvious that complex forms were 
abundant.  On the other hand, all these complexities and peculiarities reflected the actual 
development of landownership in practice as well as how difficult it was for the old legal 
framework to adjust to the needs of social and economic development.  Hence from the 
seventeenth century and in the nineteenth century at its peak, there arose the movement for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 Quoted from Simpson, pp.54. 
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reform.  The British legislation implemented some of the reform proposals in the middle of the 
19th century and in 1920s.  Although much of what those new laws did was to regularize or 
slightly simplify some practical rules which already existed, it was until then that the evolution 
of the system of landownership from feudalism to capitalism had been completed. 
 
China: More Limitations within a Stable Evolution 
 China has probably the longest independent history in the world, as well as a wealth of 
written materials.  As to information regarding land issues before Qin Dynasty (BC 221 - BC 
207), however, there are many controversies and moot points due to shortage of written 
documents.  Nevertheless we have to trace back beyond Qin Dynasty for two reasons: (1) 
Confucianism originated from that period of time; (2) the ‘ideal’ model of landownership in the 
minds of ancient Chinese scholars throughout the recent two thousand years, namely the Well 
Field System, only existed at that time. 
 In the Zhou Dynasty (BC 1100? - BC 256) the political system was similar to the feudal 
system.20  The King distributed lands to relatives and vassals and thus set up a patriarchal 
hierarchy.  This structure was constructed according to the rule that “those with the same 
surname were related by kinship while those with different surname were related by marriage”.21  
However the system of landownership was different from feudal system.  “All land under the sky 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 Simpson, pp.87. 
19 Simpson, pp.191. 
20 Under the traditional Marxist interpretation of Chinese history, the Zhou Dynasty was regarded as a slavery 
society.  This was seen fit into Marx’s social development stages.  However there are different opinions on this.  Li 
and Jiang (2006, pp.35) think that Xi Zhou was already a feudal system, similar to that in Western Europe.  They 
regard the conventional “feudal” system in China’s long history (from Qin Dynasty to Qing Dynasty) as one 
dominated by independent landlords (Feng Jian Di Zhu Zhi), which is very different from the feudal system in 
England. 
21 Zhou Zhuan, from Cheng, pp.6. 
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belong to the King”.22  The distribution of land to the peasants followed the rule known as the 
Well Field System.  “Each well had nine hundred mu, in the middle of which was public land.  
Eight families each cultivated one hundred mu of the other fields while they cooperated in tilling 
the public land.  Only after tilling the public land could they till on their own lands.”23  In spite 
of the divergent interpretations about this system, some common features could be recognized: 
(1) the land belonged to the King, but it was distributed to each family to cultivate; (2) there 
existed public land, the product of which went to the King; (3) peasants had to pay rent; (4) 
alienation of land was forbidden. 
 After the collapse of the Zhou Dynasty, the following ChunQiu (BC 770 - BC 476) and 
the Warring States (BC 475 - BC 221) period experienced an accelerating process of 
strengthening private ownership.  For example, Shang Yang, the prime minister of the Qin State, 
“abolished the Well Field System, cultivated new land, ..., permitted people to buy and sell 
land.”24  Meanwhile, the society had undergone great changes.  Gu, an ancient Chinese historian, 
commented in his book Ri Zhi Lu that “in the ChunQiu  there were still memorial ceremonies 
and strict rituals while in the Warring States nothing of those remained; in the ChunQiu 
patriarchal clanship was still mentioned while in the Warring States no words about those; ...; all 
these happened during a period of 133 years.”25  All these developments should be at least 
attributed to the strong competition among the warring states and they eventually led to the first 
unified dynasty, the Qin Dynasty. 
                                                          
22 Jing, pp.11. 
23 Wu, pp.143.  li and mu are traditional Chinese measures of length and area, about 500 meters and 667 hectares 
respectively.  there are many different opinions about the Well Field System.  Even its existence is questioned by 
some scholars. 
24 TongDian ShiHuo, quoted from Jing, pp.12. 
25 From Cheng, pp.30. 
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 When and after the Qin State unified China, it began to force large scale migration, 
especially former nobles, to cultivate frontier land.  As a result, the old system was destroyed 
and some kind of private landownership was established, though land was still said to belong to 
the emperor.26  In BC 216, the Qin emperor ordered all people to declare the actual quantity of 
land they possessed so that rent could be calculated.27  This showed that free alienation and 
inheritance of land were legally supported.  At this time peasants were required to submit rent 
and tax (fu and shui) to the central government as well as military service and labor service (fuyu 
and yaoyu).  Later, fu and shui were combined together and the military services could be 
substituted with money. 
 Since the Qin Dynasty the basic system of landownership had remained almost 
unchanged.  During this long period of time, in spite of some new changes brought into China by 
the invading nomadic nations, the basic features of landownership were stable.  This stable state 
was accompanied with (to some degree sustained by) cyclical land reform and peasant uprisings.  
Though landowners changed after those cyclic events, the form of landownership in the new 
dynasty was almost the same as in the old dynasties.  However, besides the general stabilization 
of the system there were some important trends in the two thousand years’ development. 
 Although private landownership spread rapidly during the period of the Warring States 
(BC 475 - BC 221), slavery, tenure and private ownership had since then co-existed for two 
thousand years.  In this process slavery gradually disappeared, while the tenure system had 
greatly developed.  In the Song Dynasty many peasants became tenants and the tenure system 
had spread to a large scale.  “Then the landlords who constituted 1% of the population occupied 
                                                          
26 This is also a moot point.  For some it was national landownership, and for some such as Kang Chao it was 
private landownership, while for the others it was the co-existence of multiple forms of landownership (Hu).  I will 
discuss this later. 
27 Jing, pp.12. 
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70% of cultivated land, while tenants and half-tenants (people who rented land and still owned a 
little) who constituted more than 80% of population owned less than 20% of cultivated land.”28  
Even government-owned land could be leased out.  The structure of tenure became more 
complicated and some people began to earn money by subleasing land to peasants.  This was 
called bao dian.  From the Song Dynasty and through the Ming Dynasty, perpetual tenure system 
(Yong dian) was developed.  The tenant then had both the right of perpetually cultivating the 
land and the right to alienate or sublease this right.  The tenant’s right was called tian mian quan 
while the landlord’s was called tian di quan.  In this way several people could simultaneously 
have interests on a parcel of land.  The large-scale development of the tenure system had 
important consequences in the history. 
 The spread of tenure implied the growth of land accumulation and the bankruptcy of 
small landowners who cultivated land themselves.  Since these small landowners shouldered the 
heavy burden of national rent and tax, which was vital for a strong central government, and since 
land distribution was also a politically sensitive issue, government responded to this problem 
repeatedly throughout the history.  The land policy of almost every dynasty focused on 
encouraging and fostering small landowners.  In the Han Dynasty (BC 206 - AD 220), Emperor 
Wang Mang issued the order Wang Tian Ling which “forbade any alienation of land and forced 
any family who possessed land more than one well and had less than eight male family members 
must give part of their land to neighbors.”29  Three years later this order was revoked because of 
the social disturbance it caused.  Another famous land reform policy, known as Jun Tian Ling, 
was carried out by the Tang Dynasty (AD 618 - AD 907).  Under that law, government would 
give each adult male perpetual land of twenty mu, called yong ye tian, and kou fen land of 80 mu.  
                                                          
28 Jing, pp.24. 
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Yong ye land could be inherited forever, while kou fen land was returned to the government after 
the man died or reached 60 years old.30  Behind these two typical land reform policies and the 
others adopted by each dynasty we can easily see the shadow of the Well Field System, which 
was regarded as the ideal model by scholars in almost every dynasty.  Nevertheless, all these 
laws soon failed or gradually became loosened. 
 Another trend in the history that had significant impact on landownership was the 
development of patriarchal clan system.  Although the original patriarchal clan system had been 
quite loosened since the Warring States, from the Song Dynasty (AD 960 - AD 1279) it had been 
strengthened and expanded.  Usually land within a patriarchal clan could not be bought or sold.  
Even if it must be sold, the relatives within the clan had the priority to buy.31  In some regions 
there existed common land within the clan that was called si tian or she tian.  They were created 
to help the poor within the clan.  Some people also set up charity storage of grain (yi chang) for 
the clan in case of natural disaster or famine.  When famine struck the countryside, rich families 
often donated food to relieve the poor clansmen.  During the time of social crisis or turmoil, the 
patriarchal clans were often enlarged and strengthened and became more important.  
Economically, they became large production units and militarily, they formed armed bands to 
protect themselves.  For example, in the Three States’ time (AD 220 - AD 280), Chou Tian, a 
rich landlord and later a general, “led the relatives, clansmen and dependents about several 
hundreds in total, into Mount XuWu and chose some remote and strategic place to live and 
cultivate.  ....  Many people went there to seek refuge and soon in several years’ time there 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
29 Cheng, pp.62. 
30 Jing, pp.17. 
31 Jing, pp.20. 
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gathered five thousand families.”32  Throughout the two thousand years’ time we saw the spread 
and strengthening of patriarchal clan system, both ideologically and practically. 
 As mentioned above, it had been established very early that land could be inherited.  In 
Chinese history partition of the heritage as the hereditary custom prevailed.  After the Tang 
Dynasty the law explicitly stipulated that “land, house and chattel must be divided among 
brothers”.33  In the Qing Dynasty (AD 1644 - AD 1911), the law Da Qing Lu Li ordered that “as 
to the partition of land and property, it could be equally inherited only by sons no matter his 
mother was the wife, concubine or maid”.34  Now in the countryside or even in the city, this rule 
is still applicable.  Will and primogeniture were never dominant in Chinese history, except for 
the inheritance of the Crown. 
 The rent and tax also underwent a process of reform.  Before the middle of the Tang 
Dynasty, rent and tax collected by the government were combined together and they were levied 
on persons instead of land.  Later the Tang Dynasty reformed the law to separate capitation from 
rent and tax.  In the Ming Dynasty (AD 1368 - AD 1644) all rent, tax and service were combined 
together according to the Whole Whip Act (Yi Tiao Bian).  Finally in 1727, the Qing Dynasty 
made the poll tax fixed and levied the amount of rent and tax from the increased population on 
land.  Throughout these reforms an obvious trend was that “the rent and tax levied on land and 
property became more important, while those levied on person and household became 
secondary.”35 
 Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the invasion of the industrialized countries 
had forced China to change its historical trajectory.  Since then the Chinese people have 
                                                          
32 Weishu Tianchou, quoted from Cheng, pp.117. 
33 Tang Lu Su Yi, quoted from Jing, pp.20. 
34 Jing, pp.20. 
35 Jing, pp.19. 
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experienced various political, social and economic changes.  On the one hand, it is still difficult 
to fit Chinese society into standard Western academic taxonomy such as feudalism or capitalism; 
on the other hand, it is easy to see that some basic features of landownership remained the same.  
Later we will analyze how these historic developments were affected by the culture and social 
structure of China. 
 
COMPARISON: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
 It is very clear that China and England had two very different tracks for the evolution of 
landownership.  However, due to their mutually independent development, the differences in 
time, geographic environment and even the stages of social development could not prevent us 
from extracting some general conclusions from a comparative study.  Family seemed to be of 
great importance in the early stage of each society.  Partition as hereditary customs could be 
found in both countries.  Later tenure system became dominant and the simultaneously 
polarizing process of landholding was observed.  In spite of these similarities, the great 
difference in the development path, the change of hereditary rules, the form of rent and tax, and 
delineation of property rights, marked the different cultural background of the two countries.  
 
Similarities 
 Although the differences between the two countries are probably more obvious than their 
similarities, the common features they share are very important to our understanding the 
evolution of landownership.  First, in the early stages of their histories family played an 
important role in the structure of landownership.  In Roman society family, or more accurately 
kinship, was the nucleus of the “house community” or familia.  It was “a fellowship of 
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traditional consanguinity”.36  The situation of England just before the Norman Conquest 
indicated the existence of complex and unsystematic patterns of landholding “upon the remains 
of the ancient rural community, itself a product of the old tribal arrangements with its far-
reaching family ties”.37  This point is supported by the “open-field system” of tribal custom and 
the existence of the common land inside the later manors.  The same was true for China in the 
time before the Warring States.  The prominent feature of the Zhou Dynasty (BC 1100? - BC 
256) was its emphasis on the rituals of ancestral worship and patriarchal clanship.  It was 
certainly not a coincidence that Confucianism emerged at that time. 
 Second, with the development of the society, tenure (or more precisely, leases of limited 
tenures) appeared to spread and become a dominant form.  In China, a trend from landholding by 
large numbers of small peasants to land accumulation into the hands of a small number of big 
landlords was very obvious both within a dynasty and throughout the two thousand years.  The 
evidence is the widely documented increase of the number of tenants.  In England, starting from 
the strict feudal tenure systems, “[t]he spread of leases of limited tenures, was a move towards 
greater flexibility.”38  Given the population and land, the spread of lease or tenure indicated the 
accumulation of landholdings. 
 Third, within both countries, the distribution of land appeared to be regressive.  That is, 
landholding seemed to move toward polarization.  Although Chao denied this phenomenon in 
China,39  most Chinese scholars as well as historical records confirmed its long existence.  For 
                                                          
36 Noyes, pp.40. 
37 Noyes, pp.229. 
38 Harvey, pp.342. 
39 I do not agree with Chao for the following reasons: (1) Using the historic data he supplied, which was only from 
several villages, I could not find evidence of equalization or stability.  (2) The geographic coverage of his data is not 
big enough.  (3) All historians, both in nowadays and in the history, held the opposite opinions.  (4) Even if no 
strong evidence of land accumulation had existed, it might just have been the result of other factors’ counterbalance, 
such as family, culture and government policies.  Chao did not specify the impact of these factors on his data. 
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example, Su Xun in the Song Dynasty described the situation as that “lands were not owned by 
the cultivators while the owners did not till land themselves”.40  In addition to the numerous 
accounts from historic materials, the frequent repetitions of government policies to try to check 
the polarizing process were also negative evidence.  In England, although this phenomenon 
might not be so prominent as in China, it could still be observed.  It was found that landholding 
in some place “underwent a sort of polarization process in the late fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries”.41  Harvey, in spite of some skepticism, admitted that “[w]hat we can be certain of is 
the accumulation of large holdings in so many places”, and “after the mid-fourteenth century, the 
formation of some large holdings seems to have been a consistent feature of the local land 
market”.42  Hence, given the sensitivity of this issue to society and economy, the regressive 
pattern of land distribution posed a problem to both countries. 
 Fourth, hereditary customs, which are very important to landownership, were the same in 
England in the pre-Conquest time as in China’s long history.  In Kent there was a custom by 
name ‘gavelkind’ that the land would descend to all male heirs of a tenant in equal degree.43  It 
was also observed that “in late Anglo-Saxon England there was widespread partible inheritance 
among the peasantry”.44  Until now in Chinese countryside this is still the rule, which is called 
fen chia. 
 The last common feature of our interest is the prevalence and stability of land law.  
Although there were many changes to the English land law, Simpson concluded that “the law of 
property continues to play an extraordinary measure of historical continuity”, and “[i]t is as if 
nothing fundamental has changed”.  The same is true to China.  Having experienced many 
                                                          
40 Jing, pp.24. 
41 Harvey, pp.340. 
42 Harvey, pp.342-343. 
43 Simpson, pp.21. 
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drastic changes and still changing, the landownership in contemporary China resembles many 
ancient features.  Underlying the continuance of the law is our cultural heritage. 
 
Differences 
 There are many differences between China and England, ranging from legal details to big 
theoretical issues.  Here we are only interested in the basic features of landownership and its 
evolution over time.  First and the most important difference is about alienation of land.  From 
the feudalism to capitalism, England had undergone a process from no alienation to free 
alienation.  But China is a very different story.  In the Zhou Dynasty there was a rigid structure 
of landownership, quite similar to Roman society.  After the turmoil and wars in the Warring 
States’ time, free alienation of land spread all over the country.  This happened in about BC 453 
- BC 221.  Though many people regard this point as the establishment of private property, and 
some even think this was the beginning of a market economy,45  I do not think it was the same as 
private property or market economy in our modern sense.  During the following two thousand 
years, especially after the Han Dynasty (BC 206 - AD 220), however, many political, economic 
and social measures were taken to check the development of a free land market.  Since the Han 
Dynasty almost each dynasty had tried to implement some land reform in order to restore more 
or less part of the Well Field System.  The typical administrative measures included forfeiting the 
rich families’ land, setting the maximum quantity of landholding, mandatory migration, 
distributing land to poor peasants, and so on.  Besides, the patriarchal clan system had been 
strengthened since the Song Dynasty (AD 960 - AD 1279) and its strict rules had great influence 
in limiting and checking free land alienation.  In conclusion, two opposite trends existed in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
44 Harvey, pp.354. 
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China (BC 206 - AD 1840) and England (AD 1066 - AD 1920), respectively.  One was from free 
alienation of land toward cyclical attempts of more restrictions, while the other was from no 
alienation to a free land market. 
 In regard to the inheritance of land, the history appeared to be less complicated.  
Throughout the history of China, the hereditary rule was fen chia that required equal partitioning 
among the male descendants.  The notion that land is inheritable seemed never to meet any 
challenge.  In feudal England, the tenant’s land was not regarded as inheritable at the beginning.  
When a tenant died, the land reverted back to his lord.  His heirs had to buy back their land from 
the lord.  In 1100 the Coronation Charter of Henry I changed this to that the heirs no longer 
needed to buy back their land if they paid a just and lawful relief.46  Later on the rule of 
impartible inheritance (mostly primogeniture) dominated the history.  The validity of a will on 
land began to be recognized only in the sixteenth century. 
 At very early time China had established a strong central government that required large 
amount of money, materials and services to support it.  Rent and tax were levied on person rather 
than on land, although later this rule was gradually changed.  The burden fell mostly on small 
landowners.  In addition to the rent given to the landlord, the tenants had to pay rent and tax 
directly to the royal government.47  On the other hand, royal nobles and officials were exempt 
from rent, tax and services.  Cheng listed them as: royal relatives (including people who had the 
same surname as the emperor), maternal relatives and nobles, officials, scholars.48  But in feudal 
England, peasants had no direct relationship with the King.  The King collected revenue, 
services as well as knights directly from lords in chief, while the lords collected his fees from his 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
45 For example, Kang Chao held this view. 
46 Simpson, pp.49. 
47 Hu, pp.78. 
48 Cheng, pp.55. 
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tenants.  Only in later post-medieval time the King began to levy direct tax on the people 
because of shortage of money to support the competition against rival countries.49  By 
comparison we see clearly the difference on rent, tax and servitude between the two countries.  
The English system was typically hierarchical while the Chinese system rather complicated. 
 One of the most important features of private property was the delineation of property 
rights.  Although feudal England had no private property rights at all, its strict hierarchical 
structure had stipulated clear relationship between any two levels.  The mutual relationship 
between lord and tenant was established through homage and fealty.  One of the consequences of 
homage was that the lord had the duty to guarantee the title of the tenant and protect him, while 
fealty was the oath of the tenant’s faith to services he owed to the lord.  Later on accompanying 
the gradual establishment of property rights, exclusive delineation of landownership came into 
existence.  That was why there emerged so complex a land law in England.  In contrast, the 
Chinese might never have a clear delineation of landownership in the history.  That is why there 
are so many different opinions about what type of landownership existed in China’s recent two-
thousand-year history.  One opinion (such as Marx) is that all land belonged to the emperor (or 
nationally owned), and so all people were the tenants of the emperor.  Some think that several 
types of landownership co-existed.50  Chao (1986) argues that it was private landownership that 
fostered a long history of market economy in ancient China.51  Li and Jiang (2005) hold a similar 
view; they think that the Chinese style feudal system was dominated by small landlords (Feng 
Jian Di Zhu Zhi).  My thesis is that the problem arose from the absence of clear delineation of 
landownership (or property rights) in China.  Hence the modern notions of property rights are 
difficult to apply.  What we can be certain of is that the emperor, the nation, the patriarchal clan 
                                                          
49 See North & Thomas, The Rise of the Western World. 
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and the landlord all had interests on the same parcel of land.  That’s why there were never the 
same or similar stories in Chinese history as those in British history that the King had to borrow 
money from his merchants.  It must be very ridiculous to a Chinese emperor that a king had to 
borrow money from his subjects because in his mind all the land, money and human beings 
within the territory belonged to him.  In a word, no matter what forms of landownership these 
two countries had, the existence of a clear delineation of property rights marked the difference 
between them. 
 After briefly reviewing and comparing the histories of landownership in these two 
countries, some general questions naturally arise.  Why did these two countries have so different 
development paths of landownership?  Or exactly, why were two opposite trends observed?  
Chao (1986) suggested that population pressure was the factor behind the choice of Chinese 
society.  Continuous, accelerating population pressure in ancient China is a controversial point.52  
Even if there were continuous population pressure, his conclusion would be weakened if we 
compare China with other countries.  England, as well as most Western European countries, also 
experienced population pressure and subsequent Malthusian checks such as famines, wars and 
plagues.  However they developed into another path.  This simple comparison indicates that 
population pressure was not the key factor to understand the two countries’ different choices.  
Then the question becomes: why did the two countries respond in different ways to the same 
problems?  What caused their different institutional responses? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
50 Cheng, pp.102-109, and Hu, pp.11-15. 
51 Chao, pp.2-5. 
52 Many Chinese scholars claim that the total population of China was around 60 million from the Han Dynasty to 
the Ming Dynasty and only in the Qing Dynasty population began to increase quickly.  See Jing, pp.28-29. 
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FAMILY VS. INDIVIDUAL 
 To answer the above question, my central argument is that different social units in 
England and China affected the different social patterns of landownership, and different cultures 
(based on different social units) determined their different choices and different responses to the 
same problems about land.   
 Although a lot of units can be identified in a society, such as demographic unit, political 
unit, reproduction unit, residential unit, and so on, the basic unit is the one that other units are 
derived from or determined by.  According to Macfarlane (1979), the basic social and economic 
unit in feudal England was individual,53 and later with the development of industry and 
commerce came the alienation of economic unit.  That is, the production unit and business unit 
became factory, firm or ‘enterprise’.  However in China a different type of basic unit existed.  
The Chinese social unit and economic unit was family if we do not define family in the modern 
(or Western) sense that only include father, mother and children.  The Chinese concept of 
‘family’ is bigger, usually including at least three generations and close relatives.  Relatives may 
not live together, but they often work together, do business together, and even respond as a 
whole toward outsiders and external events. 
 According to Macfarlane (1979), “a central and basic feature of English social structure 
has for long been the stress on the rights and privileges of the individual as against the wider 
group or the State.  ...  It is the view that society is constituted of autonomous, equal units, 
namely separate individuals, and that such individuals are more important, ultimately, than any 
larger constituent group.  It is reflected in the concept of individual’s direct communication with 
God.”  In the history of landownership in England, a lot of evidence supports this point.  All 
                                                          
53 I will not repeat most of his arguments, and here I will only discuss this issue in the context of landownership. 
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feudal relationships, rules and laws dealt with individual persons.  In contrast, the basic unit in 
China was family, or more precisely, ‘expanded family’.54  All social, economic activities were 
organized around the family.  For example, all rent, tax and services were levied on a family 
instead of on an individual person.  All the ancient laws, such as the Well Field System, Wang 
Tian Ling, explicitly specified their subject as families.  The hereditary rule can most clearly 
indicate the social unit.  In England primogeniture “and complete individual property in real 
estate are intimately interlinked”.55  While in China partition of heritage implied that each son is 
given the birth right of inheritance, indicating the collectivist ownership of family property.  So, 
if it is not too simplified, it could be concluded that the basic social unit or the unit of 
landownership in England was individual, while in China it was family.  This was not very 
obvious when the children were little and the unit of reproduction seemed more important.  
However, after the children grew up, in England they had to support themselves with little 
possibility to depend on others (and even heritage) for subsistence, but in China they often 
remained inside the family even after they got married early due to the desire of parents to see 
the continuance of the family.  The drive for family perpetuation often forced the Chinese young 
people get married much earlier than in England.56  In a word, the basic difference of 
landownership between the two countries was based on the difference between family and 
individual. 
 Macfarlane (1979) argues that English individualism was peculiar.  This may be 
debatable.  Harvey remarked cautiously about “a very stable balance in the conflicting claims of 
the individual and his family throughout the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries.”57  
                                                          
54 See Xiaotong Fei’s book Countryside China for more detailed analysis on this issue. 
55 Macfarlane, pp.87. 
56 See Chao, pp.8 for some detailed descriptions. 
57 Harvey, pp.354. 
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Although this paper could not carefully analyze this issue due to its focus on comparative study, 
it is obvious that, relatively speaking, England was much more individualistic than China, which 
was peculiar in another way. 
 What is peculiar about China is not that its social unit and unit of ownership were family, 
which is also common in many other traditional peasantry societies, but that the concept of 
family in China is an expanded family.  Expanding the concept further, the whole country 
including social life, social philosophy and culture was organized in a ‘family’ style.  This 
cultural tradition was so strong that no religion ever superseded it.  Confucianism best represents 
Chinese traditional culture.  The central concept of Confucianism is family, although as 
mentioned above, it refers to quite an elastic range.  In its narrowest sense it is our modern 
family, but in its broadest definition it could be the whole world.  Confucianism emphasizes 
differential levels of a society that are organized around the individual, like ripples spreading out 
in concentric circles when a stone is thrown into the water.  Emperor vs. vassal, father vs. son, 
close vs. remote relatives, husband vs. wife, the old vs. the young, leader vs. subject, …, 
spreading out all these social relationships then the social structure of a Chinese society comes 
out.  Thus Confucius claimed that cultivating one’s moral character is the way to govern family, 
then from family to nation, and finally from nation to world.58  In this world view, everybody 
should be satisfied with his relative position in the society or even in the world.  Here we see the 
source of the traditional philosophy of harmony between man and Nature.  Meanwhile we can 
also see no explicit delineation between individual, family, nation and even world, but only in a 
relative sense.  In any sense we can say that the importance of family in China is peculiar. 
                                                          
58 Fei, pp.25-28. 
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 Given their different approaches to organize the society, England and China’s difference 
in landownership could be easily explained.  Because the difference between individual, family 
and nation is a relative concept in China, it is natural that no clear delineation of property rights 
was ever made.  The rent and tax collected by the government was both for public finance and 
for the emperor’s personal wealth.  Besides individual, the patriarchal clan also has right to land 
in that they could stop the alienation of land and keep it inside the clan.  Further more, all land 
belonged to the emperor, and he could collect rent, confiscate land, force people to migrate at his 
will.  That might be the reason why rent and tax were never clearly separated in ancient China. 
 Now we can see the reasons behind the different trends in the evolution of landownership.  
Although China had established a more or less free land market as early as in the Warring States 
(BC 475 - BC 221), the Malthusian specter of population pressure and the negative effect of land 
accumulation led Chinese to check the free alienation of land, strengthen the patriarchal clan 
system and apply compulsory equalization of land distribution.  From our modern perspective 
this might lower the economic efficiency and increase social equality.  However, if we take into 
account of its particular culture, this was probably the best way available in the traditional 
Chinese society.  First, nobody could ever think of individualization as a possible approach to 
those problems related to land ownership.  Second, the Chinese culture morally and ideologically 
denounces wealth accumulation and social inequality, which were obviously opposite to the 
‘family’ value.  This was also reflected in the contempt toward merchants.  That might be one 
reason why in China merchants had never achieved the same political status as their counterparts 
in post-medieval Europe.  Throughout Chinese history there was always flow of capital from city 
to countryside, from commerce to agriculture.  After merchants made money, they bought land 
in the countryside and became landlords.  Comparing China with England, we can see an 
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interesting role of land market.  If there was not a relatively mature land market, then the 
merchants’ could not spend their money purchasing land.  That in turn might help the 
accumulation of industrial capital and eventually the industrial development.59  Third, given the 
technological level in ancient China, land accumulation could not result in significant scale 
economy.  The big landlords also leased the land to many tenant families.  The production unit 
was the same—family.  Fourth, given the family-oriented culture, land accumulation could not 
lead to labor division.  As Chao (1986) remarked, “the most powerful mechanism of 
redistribution in Chinese history was ...  the family system.  ..., the family system could make 
necessary adjustments over time to accommodate surplus population by a process of 
domesticating production unit.”60  Another function of the family system is related to its 
hereditary rule.  Under the partition rule, it is difficult to accumulate wealth for many 
generations.  Hence, in the context of Chinese culture, this evolution path of landownership was 
probably the best way for both social and economic purposes.  Free alienation of land was not 
eliminated while social development was sustained.  This is probably the reason why Chinese 
“feudal” society remained so stable over more than two thousand years. 
 In England we see a different picture.  The feudal system was imposed on Anglo-Saxon 
society by Norman knights.  Although the Conquest probably fostered the peculiar individualism 
of England, as argued by Macfarlane (1979), its rigid structure checked the economic and social 
development.  In face of Malthusian specter, the individualist culture brought about labor 
division as well as the prosperity of commerce and industry and capital began to play a more 
important role in economic development.  Besides, the individualist culture, especially the 
                                                          
59 Li and Jiang (2006, pp.24-28, pp.454-458) argue that China’s feudal landlord economy (Feng Jian Di Zhu Zhi 
Jing Ji), on the one hand, helped the development of commerce and industry, but on the other hand, also became its 
bottleneck.  They even think that it was not the self-subsistent natural economy, as the conventional wisdom put it, 
but rather a combination with market (commodity) economy. 
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primogeniture custom of inheritance helped to accumulate wealth which was crucial to the 
development of capitalism.  All these helped England to overcome the Malthusian specter and 
develop into modern capitalism with private property rights as the foundation. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 From our comparative study between England and China, it is easy to see that 
landownership as well as land law tends to be quite stable.  Their fundamental features appear to 
be prevalent for a long time.  The reason is related to social unit and culture.  Since 
landownership basically reflects the relationship among people and their interests on land, its 
basic pattern was determined by the form of social unit that represents how people interact with 
each other.  In feudal England, the social unit was the individual in a hierarchical structure and 
thus the landownership was of a hierarchical individual type.  In China, since the social unit was 
family and the social philosophy was family-oriented, landownership seems to be a mixture of 
individual, family, patriarchal clan and nation (or emperor).  This is similar to the situation 
within a traditional family, where there is no clear delineation of each other’s rights on property 
and no one cares about the delineation.  On the one hand, the form of social unit determines or 
influences social culture.  On the other hand, culture carries the inertia of society and helps to 
maintain the continuance of the basic features of landownership.  
 Although some basic features of landownership tend to be stable, its evolutionary trend 
reflects the response to social and economic changes over time.  Through the comparison 
between China and England it is found that land distribution appears to be regressive.  A 
possible conjecture is that in a closed agricultural economy and under certain technological level, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
60 Chao, pp.9. 
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land distribution tends to be a regressive process with free land alienation.61  Two different types 
of reaction appeared in England and China.  Based on the individualist culture, England 
responded with higher social mobility, more labor division, and more industrial investment.  The 
individualist culture injected strong incentive to the development of capitalism and helps to form 
capital by encouraging wealth accumulation.  Finally England escaped the Malthusian specter.  
In China’s case, however, the family-based culture mitigated the negative effects of 
landownership problems through its own mechanism.  Nevertheless, there were many peasant 
rebellions and social turmoil in Chinese history.  Chinese history shows a pattern of cyclic 
development that was based on relatively super-stable institutions and periodic attempts on limit 
private landownership.  All these indicate its path dependence (North 1991) and help to explain 
why China did not develop into capitalism and why England became the birth place of 
industrialization. 
 A further question arises.  Given that family is often the basic social unit in the traditional 
society, why did England and China choose different development paths?  Greiff (1994) argues 
that individualist society is more inclined to develop legal, political, and second-party 
institutions while the collectivist society relies more on blood and place-based relations.  His 
conjecture appears to be closely related to what we observe in the different historical trajectories 
of landownership in China and England.  However, it could not explain why one society chose a 
more individualistic approach while another pick a collectivist path.  Here I give some bold 
conjectures.  For England, Norman Conquest and the following feudal system imposed on 
Anglo-Saxen society are obviously an important reason why it developed into an individualistic 
                                                          
61 The reasons for the regressiveness include: (1) the principle of decreasing marginal revenue and population 
pressure determine that landlord will gain more advantages than peasants with the development of agriculture.  
David Ricardo’s theory on rent also suggests that rent instead of wage captures the fruit of economic development.  
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culture.  But a more fundamental reason might be that England, as an island country, relied more 
on commerce especially at its later development stages.  To China’s large-scale agricultural 
economy, the biggest and most frequent risks are natural disaster and war.  Given the 
technological level in ancient China, it was difficult and also less efficient to manage these large-
scale risks purely by legal and political institutions.  During natural disasters and wars, the most 
reliable relief comes from relatives and neighbors.  It was then not accidental that China adopted 
the social philosophy based on the expanded family in order to maintain a stable society. 
 North (1991) thinks that “[r]ulers devised property rights in their own interests and 
transaction costs resulted in typically inefficient property rights prevailing.  As a result it was 
possible to account for the widespread existence of property rights throughout history and in the 
present that did not produce economic growth.”62  The comparative study in this paper suggests 
that no rulers can really ‘devise’ property rights or landownership.  It is social unit and culture 
that determine the form of landownership.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(2) The inelastic supply of land gives the landlord more bargaining power.  (3) In face of natural disaster, small land 
owners are more vulnerable than big landlords.   
62 North, pp.7. 
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